Matthew Yglesias is a writer and journalist, co-founder of Vox, and founder of the Substack newsletter Slow Boring. His latest book is One Billion Americans: The Case for Thinking Bigger.
In this week’s conversation, Yascha Mounk and Matthew Yglesias discuss how Kamala Harris can broaden her appeal before November; what explains the lack of substantial coverage of Biden’s cognitive impairments in the mainstream press before the June debate; and how seriously we should take the evolution of economic policy in the Republican Party platform.
The transcript has been condensed and lightly edited for clarity.
Yascha Mounk: It's a strange time. So we were going to record this last Friday and then I thought, that's just too big a delay right now. Something could happen in between. And so you graciously agreed to move the recording day to Monday morning.
Matthew Yglesias: Yes, I think, in the news business, like we always, we like to sell the drama? And I think people often experience that. But this turn of events, I mean, it's not literally without precedent in American history, but it is very unusual, it is a really sharp break with the recent traditions of American politics, hearkens back to some much older moves when the whole structure of political parties was different. Even if you look at situations where presidents have not run for reelection, there's nothing comparable to Nancy Pelosi coming out of retirement with an assist from George Clooney to reconfigure a political party.
LBJ was challenged in the primaries and he did poorly in New Hampshire in the very first primary. And so then he stood down much earlier in the cycle to try to hand things off to his vice president. He was losing an intra-party factional struggle about the substance of the Vietnam War, and he tried to stand down to essentially help the kind of Cold War hawk faction stay in charge because Humphrey had a more liberal record on civil rights going back decades earlier and the thought was, you know, the Northern Union bosses liked him better, etc. It's structurally similar in that the incumbent president was unpopular, and there's certain resonances around Gaza and the happenstance of the convention being in Chicago, but it's quite different from a president being pressured: Biden had the formal tools to force himself back onto the ticket. Johnson was afraid that he was gonna lose, and that's very different.
Mounk: 1968 was in a sense a more classic political fight where there was just deep dissension within the Democratic coalition over the Vietnam War in particular and some other things. What's interesting about this political fight is that the ideological lines were very, very strange; if you had found some betmaker willing to take a bet in 2020 that the last supporters standing of Joe Biden would consist of, yes, Jim Clyburn and a couple of moderate figures, but most loudly, most pronouncedly, Bernie Sanders and AOC, that would have seemed absurd.
Yglesias: And not just 2020, right? I think if you went back as recently as February, right, when Ezra Klein wrote his op-ed calling on Biden to step aside at the beginning of this year, at that point, you would have said the most plausible challenge to Biden would come from the left. And if Biden were to step aside and have a kind of open nomination process, it would be an opportunity for the critics of this administration on the left to sort of push their agenda forward. And that's not how this wound up playing out. The Democrats who were most vocally concerned about Biden in the first instance were frontline members of Congress, people who were going to need to run for reelection in difficult districts, like Representative Jared Golden. They got some backup from people like Michael Bennett and then Nancy Pelosi and Barack Obama, who are not really factional figures, but were making an argument of pure political pragmatism and doing a lot of work along those grounds. And Biden started to gain support from Bernie Sanders, from AOC, from people who, I think, don't like the idea of electability considerations weighing heavily in the Democratic Party, who don't like the idea of donors and guys like the Pod Save America podcast guys who—I don't want to say that they're not substantive people, but those were like communications operatives from Barack Obama's campaign. And I think there's always been a concern on the left that if Democrats truly just optimized for winning in the Trump era, that that's going to mean ditching certain left-wing commitments that they believe in strongly, which I agree with, but just in a “that's good” kind of way.
Mounk: Right. Sometimes in foreign policy, the quickest guide to understanding the position of certain people, not perhaps a lot of people, but some influential people, is to think the enemy's enemy is their friend. And perhaps it helps to explain sort of the last holdouts on the pro-Biden side, because after seeing the debate, anybody with eyes to see could tell that he was not going to be an effective campaigner and that he had clearly deteriorated quite quickly over the last years meaning that we have no damn idea—and I say this with sadness—what kind of mental state is going to be in in two or three years. So to me, it was just sort of a test of basic sanity whether you thought that he could be the nominee.
The presidential race was looking very bad for Democrats. Biden was behind in the electoral average every day of this year. He had been ahead in the electoral average every day of the year 2020, as Harry Enten pointed out recently. So there's a stark contrast. There were some quotes from anonymous senior Democrats, whether or not they were truthfully reported, that the party had basically given up on trying to win this election. Now, it is looking likely that Kamala Harris is going to be the nominee. She's also unpopular. She also has some real liabilities. But she is a sentient, intelligent human being who can actually make a case, which is surely preferable. What do you think her chances of success are and what does she need to do in order to increase them?
Yglesias: She's an underdog. I was telling people who were very nervous, Democrats very nervous about Harris a week ago, I was saying, listen, if Biden steps aside and everybody rallies around Harris, you who are telling me right now that you're nervous about her, you're gonna be thrilled. The vibes are gonna improve an incredible amount to have this monkey off her back and to have a real candidate out there. And that has happened.
The bad news is—and this was always, I think, the problem with having selected Harris as VP—she is a person who made core Democrats feel better about a ticket led by Joe Biden. Like that's why she was selected in 2020. She is an image that core Democrats like for the party, that they feel good about Kamala Harris. Putting her on the ticket helped Biden a lot with grassroots small donors, for example, back in 2020. But it's bad strategic decision-making. So the challenge, the opportunity, for her is that she can campaign, she can give a good speech, she can do an interview, etc. But she's gonna have to do a two to three day victory tour, lock all her people down, get the small-donor surge, do the rollout, do the memes, etc. But then, like, they've got to get to work and deal with the fact that she is stronger than Biden is with young people where Biden had lost a lot of support, but she's weaker with old people. And she is less underwater than Biden was, but she's still underwater. She is losing to Trump by less than Biden was, but she's still losing. And her natural coalition is probably worse in the electoral college than Biden's was, and she needs to really dig in on what is always the core; Democrats need middle-aged to old white people who live in the suburbs of the secondary cities of Wisconsin, Michigan, and Pennsylvania to vote for them.
I mean, you could talk about more moderate Democrats, more progressive Democrats, but even the moderate Democratic elites like you and me, living in New York, living in DC, living in LA, living in San Francisco—the actual people you need to reach are living in Grand Rapids; they're living in the suburbs of Pittsburgh, kind of unfashionable places. They're fifty-something, they're white, and you've got to connect to them. Auditioning Andy Beshear, Josh Shapiro, Roy Cooper as your vice presidential nominee—well, picking a good VP doesn't solve political problems for you, but they are asking the right question. When those are the people you're looking at, you're asking who's going to help me reach those kinds of non-core voters, but you need to ask that question about everything that you do, right? And in particular, she is inevitably going to face certain kinds of baiting attacks, right? Republicans deliberately mispronouncing her first name, Republicans referring to her as a DEI candidate or a diversity hire. And I'm interested to see how they will respond to that.
Mounk: How should we respond to that and how should we not respond to that?
Yglesias: To succeed in California politics is hard, right? It's a crowded field, but you just play to the base. So there's a certain kind of “Yo, that's racist” response that's very powerful inside progressive circles, right? And you can weaponize really exaggerated, overblown false accusations of racism to great effect inside progressive circles. But if you're trying to go to the electorate, you want to find a way to brush that stuff off and make it clear that your focus is on the problems of average people. It's some version of “I don't mind if Republicans mispronounce my name. I mind that they—” and then fill in the blank with some message point.
Mounk: Make the attacks look petty and small by clearly implying or stating that you find them to be wrong, but sort of rising above it and pivoting to stuff that matters.
Yglesias: And pivoting to your good issues, right? Because the problem is, is that an argument that's about microaggressions is not favorable to Kamala Harris. Regardless of what the substance is, she wants an argument that's about healthcare, taxation of billionaires, the stability of the global economy, all these other things, not a kind of vindication of her personal role in the world. I think a tricky thing for people in her position to deal with is that, of course, if you are an African American woman who's prominent in American politics, you will attract racist and misogynistic criticisms. At the same time, she's a very powerful and important person. And people want to hear that she's advocating for them, not that she's advocating for herself. And that's, like, a big knock on Trump, right? He's this really selfish guy. You can't imagine him sacrificing his personal interests the way Democrats asked Joe Biden to. The trick is to not get sucked into this vortex of self-interested complaining.
Mounk: One of the very weird subplots over the last weeks was that it was some of the most progressive voices who are trying to say that Joe Biden should stay as the presidential candidate, who started to say a black woman can never win in this country. And so therefore Biden should continue to be the nominee, which is just a very strange argument for deeply progressive people to be making. And I think it flies against the evidence of lots of elections in which female candidates, black candidates and black female candidates have done quite well.
Yglesias: Absolutely. And it's hard to win elections, right? And so the challenges you face are different depending on who you are, but she needs to look at the template of Raphael Warnock, of Tammy Baldwin, of Amy Klobuchar, the people who overperform in swing states, and they all do things to sort of neutralize people's identity-based stereotyping.
Some of them are weird. They found out that posing Senator Warnock with dogs seemed to improve people's image of him. It just made him seem more like a kind of a bougie suburbanite who people were comfortable with. Tammy Baldwin though, I think is a great example. She's a lesbian. And if she had the career she had in California politics, there would be all kinds of stuff about the first lesbian United States Senator, etc. She never talks about it. She's not in the closet, but this is not her line. She talks a lot about the Wisconsin dairy industry and she breaks hard with the left on the question of soy milk; she has this bill about how you shouldn't be able to call soy milk a kind of milk, that it's not milk, and all kinds of stuff like that. My personal greatest grievance with the American left is not its enthusiasm for soy milk, but it's one that's salient and relevant to Wisconsin.
For Harris, I mean, look, she—before she was district attorney of San Francisco, she was a line prosecutor in San Francisco. Then she was DA there for seven years. She beat an incumbent by running to his right. You know, she took criticism from the left for aspects of her record as Attorney General of California in particular. She tried hard to keep convicted felons in prison in ways that alienated some left-wing people who felt that she tried too hard, that she pulled out too many stops on these kinds of things. And the best thing, the easiest thing for her to say is that she is aware of the problems of the far left in the United States of America, that she has actually taken that on in key respects and that, frankly, as a black woman, she is not going to be bullied by some of the people who may be able to get one over on a Joe Biden or a Mike Donilon or some of the other people in his circle there. Her parents immigrated to this country, right? And there's a great immigrant patriotism story to tell about that, that they did not come naive about some of the problems with the United States of America, but they felt it was the greatest land of opportunity, they raised their daughter there, etc., that she put criminals in prison because some criminals need to be in prison. I think her 2009 book about this Smart on Crime is actually quite good, and just reflects a different period in American politics than her 2019 campaign.
Mounk: I think there's two different views on this. One is that Kamala Harris has a political core and that political core is more moderate; that she won the DA race by running to the right of the other candidate, that she was a tough-on-crime prosecutor. She made her big national coming-out with a book about how she is a compassionate prosecutor but a tough one, right? And on that telling, she was kind of uniquely unlucky. I think you've said something along those lines that when she ran in 2019, 2020 for the Democratic primary, it was the moment when public opinion from Democratic coalition was perceived at least to be most to the left and she was one of the people who did a whole bunch of things to ingratiate herself with the far left, like her tweet encouraging people to contribute to a bail fund. She just wasn't able to be authentic. She was pretending to be somebody she was not. The other interpretation is that she's never had a political core. That when it seemed to be in her interest to be a centrist Democrat and to claim to be really tough on crime, that's what she did.
In the first story, she had the bad luck of being most exposed to the national stage at the one moment where she had to twist herself into pretzels. And perhaps there would have been better ways of dealing with that, but that's a hard spot to be in. And now she'll be liberated, right? In the second interpretation, she wouldn't perform much better than in 2020 because she didn't have a sincere set of views to argue then, and she doesn't now.
Which of these two interpretations do you think is closer to the mark? Because I'm genuinely agnostic at this point.
Yglesias: I mean, I think sincere views are a little bit overrated. I mean, what's Joe Biden's sincere views? I don't know. I feel personally that I just know much less about Kamala Harris than I would like to. In all candor, I have spoken to Joe Biden—
Mounk: —But Biden has a longstanding set of political instincts.
Yglesias: That's true. I've spoken to Barack Obama, I've spoken to Nancy Pelosi, I've spoken to almost everyone who was in the 2020 Democratic Party field. I've never spoken to Kamala Harris as vice president, as a presidential candidate. I met her once when she was attorney general of California. At that time, she was introduced as a rising star, and she gave what I thought was a kind of boring but wonky address about something to do with foreclosures and stuff she was dealing with as Attorney General of California. I chatted with her a little bit in a smaller group setting. After that, and again, was all, it was conversation about stuff that just didn't feel relevant five to six years later. It's unusual to have a presidential candidate whose real work experience has been in this prosecutorial kind of stuff. Because with anybody you ask, it's like, what's the core? And I think for Biden, the core of Biden's thinking is really stuff about foreign policy, more than anything else. That's what he spent the most time on in his own presidency. That's where he was most willing to chart a different course. When he gives his most important speeches, he dwells a lot on Ukraine, the future of democracy. When I spoke to him, he tried to incorporate everything he does domestically into this theme about the small-d democratic coalition globally. I have no idea just candidly what the equivalent of that for Harris is. Like, is it something about crime and urban policing, which is what the plurality of her work has been? She is the best spokesperson, has long been the best spokesperson this administration has on Dobbs and abortion rights and things like that. But that doesn't seem like enough to sort of flesh out a campaign.
So it's a big question. I mean, think it's odd to call the incumbent vice president of the United States a sort of unknown political enigma, but I do feel that I personally, as a journalist and also as a reader of journalism, have actually less information about what's important to her and who she trusts than you would expect with any of these kinds of people.
Mounk: And that in a weird way means that the range of outcomes that we could see in the next months is quite wide because perhaps she is actually able to shape her image in a way that is appealing, and that overcomes some of the weaknesses, or perhaps she'll be defined in ways that limit her appeal radically.
I feel like we're going to talk a lot about Kamala Harris in the next few months. I want to touch on a few other things. You just mentioned when you spoke to Biden. When was the last time you spoke to him?
Yglesias: That is a great question. I think about a year ago. This was a kind of off-the-record chat with a small group of about four columnists in the Oval Office. And he is old, which was perfectly evident there. He spoke with a softer tone of voice than I remembered from—I never spoke to him when he was vice president. He was a senator a long time ago and he just used to be louder. But I came out of that conversation feeling really thrilled to vouch for his ability to serve as president in a way that I was not after watching the debate and other things like that.
Mounk: And how do you now reconcile that with his performance at the debate? Is it that it's your best guess that he had good and bad moments and you got him at a good moment, or did he just deteriorate a lot over the course of that year?
Yglesias: I've had a lot of opportunities to have reporting conversations with gerontologists, which was not something I'd engaged with previously in my career. They, of course, can't diagnose somebody from a distance. But what people have told me is that when you have somebody who becomes frail and elderly, it’s similar to an athlete recovering from an injury, right? You try to manage the situation better over the longer haul. You will be able to get more done in your life over a 10-year horizon if you slow the pace down. And I think if you look at 2023, that's pretty clearly what they were doing with Biden. He did some public events. I was in there for this conversation with him, but he was not doing a lot of that kind of thing. And it clearly had something to do with his age and it was bothering people; there was polling, but there was elite criticism, like, he's gotta get out there more. And he came out for the State of the Union, delivered a strong speech and did some rallies. And I think what happened is that when they tried to increase his activity level, it didn't work.
Mounk: One of the things that shocked me about the reporting that really the main voices wanting Joe Biden to stay in the race were his wife and his son, because you’d think that if they have his best interests at heart, they should have wanted him to wind up his term and get some rest and enjoy the last years that he has on this earth.
Try and give me sort of your best read, or if you like, the most sympathetic case for why journalists messed this story up. And perhaps you don't agree with the premise, but it does seem to me that voters were onto these concerns a long time ago, right?
Yglesias: Here's the problem with people who want journalists to be right all the time, is that people get very upset. I think about when Trump was shot, right? The very first headlines that came out were very restrained and accurate. And they said things like, Trump was rushed off the stage after a series of loud popping noises. And then as it became clear that those had been gunshots, the headlines were updated. But there were a lot of conservatives who were angry about those early headlines that didn't call them gunshots when they said, I think correctly, that like, it was pretty clear they were gunshots. But I think it would have been irresponsible to say that there were gunshots when you didn't know that there were gunshots, right? If it had been that a car was backfiring and Trump was rushed off the stage by mistake, and people had thrown the country into panic by calling it gunshots, that would have been bad too.
Journalists were trying to get the story about Biden and his aging. You know, if you read something like Olivia Nuzzi’s story about this that came out after the debate, she says that she was working on that story for months. The problem was that her sources became a lot more forthcoming with her after the debate. You know, you can't write a story responsibly that's like, “if you kind of squint at these video clips and you see that the people I'm asking questions to are being a little squirrely”—what can you do, right? And so there was a lot of reporting in The New York Times on things like how the White House had changed what kind of shoes the president wears and how they were trying to stage manage his motions. There were stories about political concerns about Biden's age, but until people who had been in the room with him were willing to say things, there just wasn't a lot that you could do journalistically.
Where I messed up is that about five days before the debate, a friend of mine who was at the Los Angeles fundraiser that had been a week before told me that Biden looked terrible at this fundraiser. I don't think he can serve a second term, we're gonna have to white knuckle it through the next four months, and then Harris is gonna have to take over. But my reaction to that was, all right, this guy's kind of blowing stuff out of proportion. They wouldn't be barreling forward with the debate unless they were confident that he was gonna be okay.
He was not okay. I should have tried to scramble and find somebody else who was in the room at that fundraiser and confirm his story or not confirm it. Then after the debate, I wrote that I had been told this thing. Then a few days after that, George Clooney wrote his article. Then after George Clooney wrote his article, the kind of Pod Save America people were like, yes, Clooney is correct, etc. And that just goes to show you can have a room full of people who see something, and if none of them talk about it, it's hard to know what happens.
Mounk: Well, okay, but two things, right? Number one, that just shifts the blame from sort of beat reporters or the White House press corps to other key figures in this alliance. And the people at Pod Save America, of course, they’re sort of a weird mix between political operative and journalists, but they claim to be journalists at this point, right? They run a media company. They have a very, very popular podcast. And if they all were there, they didn't need a source. They have a pretty damn big microphone. They have a bigger microphone, I believe, than certainly me and probably you.
Yglesias: They've got a huge microphone, yes.
Mounk: So it is on them to have said this. And it is, I think, understandable that people are saying, why can we trust any of these damn journalists if they were in the room, and they didn't say it? To pretend that there's this sort of hermetically sealed-off world of journalists who just couldn't get the confirmation, I think is slightly overstating the case.
Obviously we're recording this very briefly after Joe Biden decided in this pretty historic turn that he's not running and it became very clear that Kamala Harris is going to be the nominee. But obviously it's very important to think about what Trump is up to at the moment. One of the questions that's been going around in the last days and weeks is whether there's a kind of vibe shift, whether somehow Trump has not just been able to significantly increase his support in parts of the American elite, particularly on Wall Street and Silicon Valley, but whether more broadly a certain kind of taboo against supporting Trump has broken, whether the kind of consequences that people fear from publicly endorsing Trump have sort of dissipated. And this is of course against the background of particularly younger and non-white voters trending to Trump in recent polls. At the same time, when you look at the share of Americans who have a very unfavorable opinion of Donald Trump, it's a little bit lower than it was two years ago, but it's still very, very high.
Do you think this vibe shift is real and if so, what produced it?
Yglesias: I think there's two different things happening. One is, the political scientists say there's thermostatic public opinion, right? So when Trump was president, progressive-minded people became more favorable to immigration than they really were. Like not thinking it through. Now that Biden has been president, there has been a shift in the other direction, very notably on immigration, but on a lot of topics. There's been a kind of a perestroika around woke culture in certain segments of the progressive universe, but there's also been a rightward swing in mass opinion on sort of broad kinds of topics. You can call that a vibe shift.
Traditionally, Wall Street and Silicon Valley were very socially culturally liberal kinds of places, right? Because of which cities they were located, because they have very, very high-IQ people working in those fields, and those people tend to be quite left-wing on progressive issues, because the workforce at those companies tends to be pretty liberal, etc. And so, an executive of a software company was expected to do a lot of virtue signaling around diversity and around climate change, not necessarily in a partisan political way. But a company like Apple would both lobby furiously for right-wing tax policy, because that's what you do when you're a big company, but also do a lot of talk about having carbon-neutral stores.
That made it very hard for anyone in that field to say positive things about Donald Trump, even though they again lobbied very aggressively in favor of his tax policies. If you look at what Trump actually did as president, the main thing he did was pass an enormous tax cut for multinational corporations. They could onshore money at a discount tax rate, etc. Tim Cook was never gonna say that in public. But Elon Musk, David Sacks, few other people, venture capitalists in Silicon Valley have made a push over a course of years to change that and to say that if you just like Trump's policies, you should go say that and like stop saying that you really care a lot about net-zero goals or girls who code or all this other kind of stuff and just be Republicans now. It'll be interesting to see where that goes if Harris is reelected; I think the vibes will keep shifting in that direction. If Trump becomes president, I think there'll be a backlash in the other direction because Trump is gonna start to govern.
Mounk: It's a little bit hard to read where the Republican Party is on the economy because on the one hand, as you're pointing out, the actual actions of the first Trump administration were in many ways those of a quite classic Republican administration. The biggest tax reform was one that really helped big multinational corporations. On the other hand, you do have this real sense that the rhetoric and some of where the initiative is on public policy in the party is starting to shift. George W. Bush in 2000 ran in part on privatizing Social Security. In 2016, Trump distinguished himself from the rest of the field by saying that perhaps the state does have a role to play in healthcare. And now he chose JD Vance, one of the younger figures in the party who do appear to be at least somewhat intellectually serious about wanting to build this kind of multiracial, you know, working-class coalition and who's much more comfortable lambasting big corporations and so on than previous generations of Republicans would be. You had the president of the teamsters union address the Republican national convention. And one of the indications that there might be something serious to this is that the people in the party who are really driven by an older form of laissez-faire economics or an older form of economic conservatism or Reaganite economics are really quite unsettled by this.
How should we think about the sort of evolution of economic policy in the Republican Party?
Yglesias: So I'm working on a piece about this. I don't wanna say that it's fake. I think that that's sometimes overstated. I think it's less new than it is often cast to be. You know, George W. Bush ran in 2000 saying that he was gonna be a compassionate conservative and criticizing House Republicans for “trying to balance the budget on the backs of the poor.” His father ran in 1988 promising a kinder, gentler America that would be characterized by a thousand points of light. Ronald Reagan actually ran and won as a kind of hard-right-on-economics guy, which is why he was so striking. But Gerald Ford was from the moderate wing of the Republican Party. Richard Nixon said we're all Keynesians now. Dwight Eisenhower said any man who doesn't accept the New Deal and Social Security is a fool. So the traditional template for Republicans to win elections has been to say that they oppose new progressive economic ideas, but that they accept the policy ratchet of the past. On that level, I don't know that Vance even does accept that policy ratchet. As far as I know, he favors repealing the Affordable Care Act, he favors large cuts to Medicaid. This is super obscure, but there's this question about Basel III capital regulations for banks, the idea here being that banks should have to take less risks in their lending to have lower risk of failure. So Vance put out a letter saying that these enhanced requirements should not apply to banks of between $700 billion and $100 billion in assets. So in his speech about this, he frames it as like he's standing up for small businesses against these giant Wall Street companies.
I think there's a kind of sincere Midwest Republicanism that wants to champion the interests of medium-sized business enterprises that are headquartered in states like Ohio. What does that amount to exactly? It's a complicated policy conversation, but to me that's different from championing the interests of the working class or poor people. It's championing the interests of heartland business owners rather than the interests of the owners of the biggest companies in the world—although, as we were talking about with the vibes, the Silicon Valley investor class also seems quite enthusiastic about Vance. Now, of course they could say themselves, you know, a VC firm like Sequoia or Andreessen Horowitz is a much smaller enterprise than Goldman Sachs or JP Morgan. So when we champion small business, is that what we mean? Like small regional banks? Like the world's biggest venture capital company? I don't know. So I think it's a bigger shift in presentation than it is in the kind of historical groundings of the Republican Party. But the way politics works, if it does work, is that center-right political parties see the activist left and they see some things that the activist left is putting on the agenda that are irresponsible or toxically unpopular and they see other things that are like responding to real social crises and conservative movements try to preempt social revolution by co-opting aspects of those kinds of concerns.
That's, I think, the generous interpretation of JD Vance, that he hears what left-wing radicals are saying about problems with the status quo, and he is trying to find a way to wrestle that into a conservative framework. I find it a little hard to have a generous interpretation of Donald Trump on that score, but in the broad sweep of history, that's how functional democracies work, is that the conservative party is always putting a new foot forward and caring about working-class people's concerns.
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